Chinese multinational enterprises in Europe and Africa: How do they perceive political risk? by Xia Han (73012) et al.
1 
 
Chinese Multinational Enterprises in Europe and Africa: 
How do They Perceive Political Risk?  
 
Xia Hana 
a Coventry Business School 
Coventry University 
CV1 5FB 
 
Xiaohui Liub*c 
Lan Gaob 
b School of Business and Economics 
Loughborough University 
Leicestershire, LE11 3TU 
c School of International Business 
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics 
Chengdu, China 
 
Pervez Ghaurid 
d Birmingham Business School 
University of Birmingham 
Birmingham, B15 2TY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
* Corresponding author. Email: x.liu2@lboro.ac.uk 
 
2 
 
Chinese Multinational Enterprises in Europe and Africa: 
How do They Perceive Political Risk? 
 
Abstract  
The concept of political risk has been defined from the perspective of developed-country multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) and has mainly focused on the political and regulatory perils in developing host countries. 
However, we have limited understanding of how emerging market firms perceive political risk in international 
marketplaces. Adopting a case study method, we examine how Chinese MNEs perceive political risk when 
operating in developed and developing host countries, specifically, the European Union (EU) and Africa. Our 
findings show that Chinese MNEs regard their home-country origin and industry-specific restrictions as major 
political risks in the EU. By contrast, they consider the volatile political environment in some African countries 
as the main source of political risk. In addition to the sharp contrast in the political and regulatory environment 
between the EU and African states, Chinese MNEs commonly encounter political risks in both markets due to 
their own behaviour.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Outward foreign direct investment (FDI) by emerging economy multinational enterprises (EEMNEs) has 
become one of the most researched topics in international business (IB). The political risk faced by EEMNEs in 
international marketplaces has also received increasing attention. Extant research has commonly defined 
political risk as the unexpected change of the ‘rules of the game’ by host-country governments that can 
adversely affect business operations (Butler and Joaquin 1998; Casson and Lopes 2013). While this line of 
enquiry has generated insights regarding how EEMNEs respond to and manage host-country political risk 
(Buckley et al. 2007; Liu et al. 2016), extant research implicitly assumes that political risk is universal, and 
EEMNEs face the same types of political risk as developed-country MNEs (DMNEs). Thus, our knowledge 
about how political risk is conceived from the viewpoint of these new players remains limited. 
Existing literature in this field can be divided into two streams. The first stream of research looks at the impact 
of political risk on EEMNEs when venturing into other developing host countries. Drawing on conceptual 
models of DMNEs, this stream of research assumes that these new players are tempted by, and show greater 
competitiveness, in risker political environments (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008). A second, small but 
growing stream of research concerns EEMNEs expanding into more advanced economies. Although these 
countries are renowned for their well-established market systems and institutions, this does not imply that firms 
operating in these contexts are shielded from changing external circumstances (Bremmer 2014). However, 
extant literature has mainly applied the established concept of political risk based on DMNEs. Little attention 
has been devoted to the fundamental issues of how EEMNEs perceive political risk in overseas marketplaces, 
given substantial home-government involvement in their international activities (Peng 2012). Thus, this study 
explicitly examines the question as to how EEMNEs perceive political risk when operating in diverse 
institutional environments, including developed and developing host countries  
To address the above research question, we adopt a qualitative case study approach to examine the political risk 
perceived by Chinese MNEs operating in the EU and in African countries. While much has been reported about 
the political obstacles faced by Chinese MNEs in international marketplaces (Globerman and Shapiro 2009; Liu 
et al. 2016), the EU as the world largest single market, and Africa as an increasingly important economic power, 
have not been thoroughly investigated. Therefore, our research focuses on these two regions.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature on political risk in IB. First, we depart from existing 
studies which assume that political risks faced by EEMNEs are consistent with traditional definitions drawn 
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from the experience of DMNEs by systematically unpacking the concept of political risk from EEMNEs’ 
perspective (Liu et al. 2016; Quer et al. 2012). Second, taking Chinese MNEs’ FDI as our research object, we 
find that the political risks faced by these new players are multidimensional and rooted in a number of home 
country, host country, industry and firm-behaviour sources. This finding is in stark contrast to the traditional 
conceptualization of political risk which has mainly focused on the host-country environment and industry 
characteristics. Third, by comparing Chinese MNEs’ perceived political risks in different institutional settings, 
we find that the perception varies depending on the external institutional environment. In more developed 
European market settings, the country-of-origin, EU industrial regulations, and Chinese firms’ own behaviour 
are the main sources of political risk, while in the less developed African markets, political risks are rooted in 
host-country conditions and firms’ own behaviour. Thus, our study suggests that the boundaries of political risk 
perceived by EEMNEs are much broader than those based on DMNEs.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
What is Risk? 
While scholars have generally recognized the critical role of risk in affecting MNEs’ international operations, 
little agreement has been reached with regard to the conceptualization and scope of risk (Buckley 2016; Liesch 
et al. 2011). Extant literature has offered various definitions. One stream of research uses a statistical probability 
approach to define risk as the quantifiable probability that events will occur and influence business operations 
(Knight 1921; Liesch et al. 2011). The other looks at the potential loss vis-à-vis the potential gain of a decision, 
and frames risk as the negative variation in business outcomes (March and Shapira 1987). Yet, another group of 
researchers focuses on the unknowability of the external environment and defines risk as significant 
contingencies that reduce performance predictability (Miller 1992; 2007). 
Confusion about the notion of risk goes further as research has often used the terms, risk and uncertainty, in an 
interchangeable manner (Buckley et al. 2016). Some studies have treated risk and uncertainty as a composite 
variable and label them as synonymous (Alvarez and Barney 2005). This has resulted in misconceptions about 
their roles in IB as risk and uncertainty are related but distinct concepts (McKelvie et al. 2011). While both can 
arise from firms’ external environments, their underlying assumptions and their impact on MNEs’ international 
operations are different (Buckley 2016).  
Under Knight’s (1921) statistical metaphor, risk refers to a set of possible outcomes, and the likelihood of each 
occurring can be calculated, whilst uncertainty refers to outcomes where the likelihood of each taking place is 
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unknown. Yet, this approach has been challenged due to its neglect of the role of decision makers (Miller 2007). 
Hence, the emphasis of human judgement in the decision-making process has given rise to research that 
distinguishes risk and uncertainty by drawing on transactional cost economics (TCE). Studies anchored within 
TCE assume that decision-makers are bounded-rational, and the lack of information makes them hesitate to 
make decisions or act under uncertain situations (Buckley and Carter 2004; Williamson 1985). 
Additionally, another group of researchers drawing on the real option (RO) theory assumes that decision-makers 
are rational and risk-averse, thus being able to choose among a set of future states with relevant information 
(Billitteri et al. 2013). It has been suggested that decision-makers are not strictly rational since they are bounded 
by cognitive limitations, but it does not imply that they are irrational (Miller 2007; Payne et al. 1993). Rather, 
when decision-makers have accumulated more information they can convert some uncertainties to risk, hence 
allowing them to make decisions and take action (Sarasvathy 2001). This evolving view of managerial 
rationality is a key step which can help bridge the existing research on risk and uncertainty, drawing on the 
seemingly contradictory TCE and RO perspectives. Hence, the conversion from uncertainty to risk may be 
moderated by the possession of information (Buckley 2016). When there is more information available, firms 
can make investment decisions. Thus, it may be more appropriate to conceive of uncertainty as a general 
environmental phenomenon, whilst risk is investor and investment specific (Liesch et al. 2011; March and 
Shapira 1987). As Friedmann and Kim (1988) suggested, risk cannot exist without the presence of an 
organizational entity or activity in a host country, but uncertainty as an environmental character can. This 
corresponds to Kobrin’s (1979) argument that research on political risk in MNEs’ international operations 
should focus on the impact of political events upon firms rather than the events per se. Thus, in this study we 
follow previous research (Casson and Lopes 2013; Friedmann and Kim 1988) by focusing exclusively on 
political risk.   
What is Political Risk? 
Although the term ‘political risk’ appears frequently in the literature, agreement about its definition remains 
limited (Darendeli and Hill 2016; Kobrin 1979). The literature can be generally divided into two groups. The 
first group assumes an adversarial relationship between the government and business (Alon and Herbert 2009). 
Research built upon this assumption has offered a variety of definitions. For example, political risk has been 
defined as host government interference with MNEs’ operations (Butler and Joaquin 1998), as constraints 
imposed on firms from specific countries or industries (Desbordes 2010; Robock 1971), and as discontinuities 
occurring in the business environment due to political changes (Fitzpatrick 1983).  
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More recent literature tends to assume a co-operative relationship between MNEs and host-country governments 
by underscoring the potential for mutual gain (Darendeli and Hill 2016; Jiménez et al. 2015), as political 
interference in MNEs’ operations, tempted by short-term gains, may jeopardize the government’s own 
objectives, such as economic growth generated as a result of FDI (Luo 2001). This group of researchers suggests 
that perceived political risk by MNEs depends on whether their business objectives are consistent with the host 
government’s long-term political, economic and social agendas (Stevens et al. 2015). Firms may perceive a 
lower degree of political risk when their activities are more aligned with the government’s long-term goals 
(Henisz and Zelner 2005). Thus, this strand of research regards political risk as a complex and multidimensional 
phenomenon that may arise from a variety of host- and home-country sources (Click 2012; Stevens et al. 2015). 
MNEs are not only affected by governmental actions and political changes in host countries, but are also 
increasingly under scrutiny from host-country stakeholders regarding, for example, whether they acknowledge 
their corporate social responsibilities towards natural environmental protection, sustainable development and 
fair treatment for local employees (Scherer et al. 2013).  
Conceptualization of Political Risk 
While research on the role of political risk in MNEs’ international success has progressed, its conceptualization 
and theoretical boundaries remain a fragmented and narrowly defined area (Jakobsen 2010). This section 
focuses on how political risk has been conceptualized when MNEs operate in heterogeneous institutional and 
industrial contexts.  
Institutional boundary of political risk for DMNEs and EEMNEs 
Initial research has used the above mentioned definitions to capture how political risks are perceived by DMNEs. 
Several conceptual frameworks have been proposed to examine the political perils faced by American, European 
and Japanese MNEs. Simon (1984) noted that political risk in a host country depends on its stage of institutional 
and economic development. MNEs tend to face non-violent political risks, such as unfavourable legal rulings 
and stringent entry requirements, in countries with well-established socio-political and economic systems 
(Bremmer 2014; Simon 1984). By contrast, more severe risks, such as the overthrown of political regimes, wars, 
and expropriations are likely to occur in host countries with an underdeveloped socio-political and economic 
environment (Casson and Lopes 2013). Jensen (2008) maintained that MNEs investing in developing countries 
with democratic regimes tend to face a lower degree of political risk and are less likely to experience 
expropriation and political violence risks. Drawing from the political science literature, Desbordes (2010) 
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proposed that hostile political relations between home and host countries may impose political obstacles on 
MNEs’ overseas operations.   
In addition, the rapid growth of FDI conducted by EEMNEs has stimulated research to analyse how these new 
players perceive political risk in overseas markets (Buckley et al. 2007; Liu et al. 2016). This newer stream of 
research suggests that the types of political risk faced by EEMNEs tend to be more heterogeneous than those of 
DMNEs (Satyanand 2010). A number of studies have found that EEMNEs are not discouraged, but show a 
greater willingness to expand into risky environments (Buckley et al., 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008; 
Liu et al., 2016). By contrast, for those expanding into developed countries, EEMNEs tend to face stringent 
government investigation and political opposition (Bremmer 2014; Globerman and Shaprio 2009). Moreover, 
such hurdles are more intensive for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than private firms (Cui and Jiang 2012; 
Meyer et al. 2014). A significant portion of these risks arise from EEMNEs’ country-of-origin (Globerman and 
Shapiro 2009), which has been largely overlooked in the existing literature (Moeller et al. 2013). Yet the 
adoption of conceptual frameworks based on DMNEs’ experience may lead researchers to oversimplify the way 
that political risks are perceived by EEMNEs. As the rapid internationalisation of EEMNEs may challenge the 
existing theories of internationalisation (Liu et al. 2005), it is important to reconceptualize political risk from the 
perspective of these new players.   
Industrial boundaries of political risk for DMNEs and EEMNEs  
Political risk can be experienced either by all firms of an entire country or by those from selected countries, 
industries, or those undertaking specific activities (Robock 1971). While extant literature has yielded insights 
into the political risks associated with the host-country’s macro environment, research on industry-related 
political risks is still at an early stage (Alon and Herbert 2009). Existing studies have examined DMNEs 
operating in key regulated industries such as extraction, petroleum, banking, telecommunications and utilities 
and reported that these industries are subject to greater government intervention than those more liberalized 
industries with fewer restrictions, and thus exposed those MNEs to a higher degree of political risk (Bonardi et 
al. 2006). Yaprak and Sheldon (1984) showed that MNEs operating in natural resources and financial service 
industries experienced a higher degree of political risk than those in technologically dynamic industries. 
Jakobsen (2010) found that in the global aluminium industry, substantial political risks are present in developing 
host countries despite their welcoming attitude to FDI. Despite previous research showing that operating in key 
regulated industries may have important political implications (Bremmer 2014), an in-depth examination of how 
such industry-related political risks are perceived by EEMNEs is absent.   
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RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY 
We employ the qualitative case study method to explore Chinese MNEs’ perception of political risks when 
operating in the EU and African countries. Our objective is to (1) enrich the understanding of political risk from 
the perspective of EEMNEs and (2) delineate the boundary conditions of perceived political risk by EEMNEs in 
different institutional and industrial contexts. Qualitative exploratory research is particularly effective in 
opening the ‘black box’ of what lies behind the phenomenon and helping to answer the how and why questions 
(Doz 2011: 583). In particular, the use of qualitative data enables us to better understand the neglected aspects 
of risk perception by EEMNEs, thus helping us to draw new theoretical insights, and systematically re-
conceptualize the notion of political risk based on the experience of EEMNEs.  
Sampling 
Following Yin (2003), two criteria have been used to select the sample firms and interviewees. First, the length 
of internationalization should be sufficient for us to collect meaningful information on firms’ perception of 
political risk. Therefore, we selected firms with an overseas presence of at least five years to allow us to explore 
the issues related to political risk that they have encountered (Gao et al. 2015). Second, the interviewees need to 
be familiar with their companies’ international strategies and operations. Thus, those who worked at the 
international investment department of the corporate headquarters, or were responsible for international 
operations, were considered to be the most appropriate participants. Our unit of analysis is individual Chinese 
firms that operate in the EU and African countries. These two markets are our research contexts which enable us 
to compare and contrast the perceptions of political risk of the sample firms.  
Potential companies were approached through the authors’ personal networks. Initial communication with the 
interviewees was made to explain the nature of this study, with the promise of anonymity. We included a variety 
of firms with different ownership forms (SOEs vs. private-owned firms), various lengths of international 
experience and different industries in order to capture the variations in perceived political risks by these firms. 
Eighteen companies agreed to participate in our study. We then checked their suitability and excluded two 
operating outside the EU or Africa. As a result, our sample consisted of sixteen companies that have an 
established presence in the EU and/or African countries. Detailed characteristics of our sample companies are 
presented in Table 1.   
Insert Table 1 about here  
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Data Collection 
Reconceptualizing political risk requires the consideration of a multitude of factors (Alon and Herbert 2009). 
Hence, our interview guide was structured around the broad theme of how Chinese MNEs perceive political risk 
in their overseas operations. Based on five pilot interviews with industrial experts, we revised the interview 
guide in order to avoid inappropriate questions. Semi-structured interviews were carried out to encourage the 
interviewees to provide their opinions regarding the questions.  
We conducted two rounds of interviews from October 2014 to April 2016 to safeguard the reliability of our data.  
The first round included sixteen face-to-face interviews. At the end of these interviews, we asked the 
interviewees to introduce colleagues who could also participate in this research. A total of eleven interviewees 
provided their colleagues’ contact information and those people were interviewed in the second round. In total, 
we conducted twenty seven interviews. The interviews were conducted in Mandarin (24) and English (3) and 
were recorded. The length of interviews varied from fifty minutes to three and a half hours. All interviews were 
transcribed within 24 hours to minimize information loss. We also collected archival data from multiple sources, 
including corporation websites, television interviews and newspapers. In addition, we contacted government 
agencies and professional associations, such as the Industrial Development Authority in Ireland and the Chinese 
General Chamber of Commerce in Africa to enquire about specific investment policies. These data complement 
the information from our interviews and facilitate an in-depth understanding of the political risks faced by our 
sample firms in overseas markets.  
Data Analysis 
We started by coding and analysing each interview transcript, i.e. within-case analysis. As we were interested in 
comparing Chinese MNEs in European and African markets, transcripts were classified into two groups 
according to their host region. For companies having a presence in both, we coded their European and African 
operations separately. Within-case analysis was followed by cross-case analysis that aimed at classifying 
emerging categories.  
Each interview transcript was studied for similarities and differences (Glaser and Strauss 1967). We merged 
similar codes into the same first-order category and continued coding the transcripts in this manner until no 
further distinct or shared patterns could be detected. Alongside developing first-order categories, we identified 
linkages among these categories that could lead to the development of more theoretically-oriented second-order 
themes. We then distilled the second-order themes into more aggregated dimensions, which enabled us to 
understand how Chinese MNEs view political risk at country, industry and firm level.   
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Figures 1a and 1b provide an overview of our data structure. As we coded Chinese MNEs operating in the EU 
and African countries in two groups, a three-step process in data analysis was used in each group (Gioia et al. 
2013). As shown in Figure 1a, for Chinese MNEs operating in the EU, we identified thirteen categories in the 
first-order analysis. In the second-order codes, we identified six themes. We then distilled these themes into 
three theoretical dimensions: home-country sourced political risks, industry-sourced political risks, and firm-
behaviour sourced political risks. Figure 1b reported the types of political risk encountered by Chinese MNEs in 
African countries. We identified nine categories in the first-order analysis, while the second-order codes were 
classified into four themes. Finally, we aggregated these themes into two theoretical dimensions: host-country 
sourced political risks and firm-behaviour sourced political risks.  
Insert Fig 1a and Fig 1b about here 
FINDINGS 
Political risks perceived by Chinese MNEs in their European and African operations can arise at country, 
industry, and firm-behaviour levels. At the country level, the evidence reveals that Chinese MNEs perceive 
political risks differently in European and African markets. While the more stable institutional environment in 
the EU has presented MNEs with opportunities, the ‘baggage’ that Chinese MNEs carry from home has 
subjected them to subtler and more implicit home-country sourced political risks. By contrast, the volatile 
institutional context in Africa has exposed Chinese MNEs to more drastic political changes, and hence the 
political risks that they face have tended to arise from the underdeveloped political and regulatory environment 
in the host country. The industrial context can have important implications for Chinese MNEs’ venturing into 
the European market. Chinese MNEs operating in more regulated sectors face a wider array of rules imposed by 
the host country and the EU than those in more liberalized industries. At firm level, a common type of political 
risk faced by Chinese MNEs in overseas markets largely resulted from their own inappropriate behaviour.  
Home-country Sourced Political Risks in the EU 
Our findings revealed that differences in ideologies, concerns over national security, and competition for 
economic dominance can put Chinese MNEs under political pressure even when expanding into developed 
countries where well-established market institutions provide a sound environment. The ‘hand’ of the home-
country government can travel abroad with its MNEs and acts as a political barrier to firms’ overseas expansion. 
For Chinese MNEs venturing into the EU, their home-country origin was considered by our interviewees to be a 
major source of political risk, impeding their firms’ overseas operations. Such home-country sourced political 
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risks mainly result from potential threats to the host-country’s national security as perceived by the host-country 
government, and the unfair advantages conferred by the home-country government.  
Threats to the host-country’s national security 
The evidence reveals that host government concerns over the national security of strategic assets, ongoing 
competition for economic dominance, and different political ideologies have made Chinese MNEs subject to 
substantial political and regulatory screening. The view of our interviewees was that host governments were 
concerned about losing strategic resources and technologies to Chinese competitors, which in turn could 
undermine their country’s economic security and competitiveness. For example, the demand for high-quality 
food products has prompted Chinese MNEs to enter the European dairy sector. This has posed significant threats 
to the availability of some dairy products for European consumers and thus has led some EU member states to 
introduce additional purchase quotas and regulatory screening for acquisitions proposed by Chinese companies. 
Similarly, the capability of reverse engineering and economies of scale possessed by Chinese MNEs allow them 
to enter the European market at lower costs. This represents a critical threat to the host-country’s 
competitiveness. Hence, stricter regulations on Chinese MNEs have been introduced by the EU to secure their 
technological assets.  
“European (country) governments are very suspicious to us. They do not want to waive these industries into to 
the hands of Chinese firms because they do not want to see customers or products from China occupy their 
market.” (Firm O, Interviewee O1)  
Moreover, the free market economy is the dominant economic ideology in the EU where most business 
transactions are shaped by market-based mechanisms. It is therefore difficult for the policymakers of these 
countries to accept the excessive involvement of the Chinese government in business activities when that 
involvement could harm free-market competition. As our interviewees reflected, the appointment of government 
officials and the heavy involvement of the Chinese government in FDI projects are likely to result in barriers to 
Chinese investment being approved by the host government.  
“When we met the mayor of XXX (a French city), we were asked by a French official about whether our project 
needs to be approved by the Chinese government and whether there will be Chinese officials sitting on the 
executive board. … As you know, Western countries are sensitive to, and very averse about political involvement 
in commercial activities.” (Firm O, Interviewee O2) 
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In addition, Chinese MNEs are perceived to be linked to China’s national objectives and interests. They are 
considered not only as commercial entities, but also as carriers of home-government political missions. This has 
made the EU member states wary of Chinese MNEs as they may pose threats to host countries by spreading 
competing political ideologies. Many interviewees suggested that the competing political ideologies between 
European countries and China have resulted in greater political resistance with regard to Chinese MNEs in the 
belief that they represent the Chinese government.  
“When we conduct business in European countries, some of their governments are very cautious because they 
think that the Chinese government stands behind us.” (Firm C, Interviewee C1)  
This is especially salient with regard to Chinese SOEs, which are more likely to cause EU government concerns 
and political opposition than their private counterparts. This has largely resulted from Chinese SOEs’ closer 
affiliation with their home government.   
“We can access the European market but merely doing property investment. We cannot bid for infrastructure or 
national security-related projects in these countries. Their (EU members) governments  will not allow Chinese 
companies, especially SOEs, to enter these industries because they are concerned about our political intentions 
and links with the communist party at home.” (Firm M, Interviewee M2)  
Unfair competition 
In addition to concerns over national security, Chinese MNEs’ access to funds provided by the home-country 
government has been a controversial issue as it is considered an unfair advantage for Chinese MNEs. Such 
access to financial support at home has been perceived by the host-country government to harm market 
competition. Thus, it could trigger host-government speculation regarding capital offered by the Chinese 
government, which in turn could become a source of political risk. Home-government subsidies and cheap loans 
are deemed a key source of unfair advantage that can distort market competition within the EU. It is well known 
that the ambition of establishing world-class MNEs has prompted the Chinese government to offer subsidies to 
boost Chinese MNEs’ competitiveness so that their products can be sold at lower prices in overseas markets. 
However, the subsidies violate the EU competition rules and put other companies at a greater competitive 
disadvantage. Several cases have been filed by the European Commission (EC) targeting Chinese products and 
firms that are subsidized by the Chinese government. As our interviewee explained, anti-subsidy investigations 
launched by the EC represent an important political obstacle that has discouraged them for further investment.  
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“We would like to expand our investments in Europe. But the anti-subsidy case filed by the EC has discouraged 
us and made us feel very uncomfortable.”  (Firm E, Archive) 
Additionally, the financial market imperfections in China enable Chinese MNEs to access cheap finance that     
reduce their costs. Chinese policy banks have launched low-interest loans and export credit schemes to foster the 
competitiveness of Chinese high-tech, electronic, and equipment firms. Such cheap funds have been perceived 
as unfair competition and against free-market competition. A number of our interviewees indicated that the EU 
host-country governments tended to be suspicious of their companies’ source of funds. Cheap finance from the 
home government thus constitutes a home-country sourced political risk faced by Chinese MNEs in Europe.  
“Abundant capital provision from China is not an absolute advantage but a drawback sometimes. We have been 
asked by the French government to explain whether we have got cheap loans from China. Some governments in 
the EU are very cautious that Chinese firms’ cheap capital access can damage the market order and put other 
firms in a disadvantaged position.” (Firm O, Interviewee O2) 
Host-country Sourced Political Risks in African Countries 
Chinese MNEs were prompted by the opportunities presented in African countries, such as first-mover 
advantages and less sophisticated consumer demands. However, the volatile political environments within and 
across some African states have imposed daunting challenges on Chinese MNEs. Our evidence shows that 
radical conflicts at national and regional levels have been Chinese MNEs’ major sources of political concern.  
Volatile political environment in the host country 
The changing political regimes in some countries can cause social unrest, thus put foreign MNEs’ personnel and 
asset safety at greater risk. In almost all of our interviews, a change of political regime is considered to be a 
critical issue for Chinese MNEs operating in Africa. Several interviewees reflected that their firms were 
reluctant to undertake investment initiatives in countries where governments were unstable, primarily due to 
security concerns.  
“For Africa, our main worry is still about risk and associated safety issues of our personnel, financial and non-
financial assets. There are nearly 400,000 Chinese people in Angola. If a civil war takes place, it would be 
impossible to evacuate all of our workers.” (Firm M, Interviewee M1).  
The volatile political and regulatory environment in the host country can also take the form of a poorly enforced 
legal framework that subjects Chinese MNEs to inconsistent interpretations of investment regulations. The 
weakly enforced regulatory frameworks in some African countries have exposed Chinese MNEs to risks, such 
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as a breach of contract by the host government and discretionary legal enforcement by local judiciary bodies. 
Many of our interviewees indicated that their African operations have been subject to the cancellation of 
payments and discretionary interpretations of regulations by the host-country government. 
“The police and judiciary in Sudan have great discretion, and are very tough towards foreign companies. 
Various fees and fines can be levied on us for different reasons whenever they want.” (Firm P, Interviewee P2).  
Regional conflicts 
Beside a generally volatile political environment within the host country, conflicts at interstate and regional 
levels are regarded by our interviewees as another source of political risk when venturing into Africa. Political 
shocks, such as the outbreak of interstate wars and territorial disputes, have led Chinese MNEs to suffer 
significant loss.  
“The separation of North Sudan and South Sudan has caused wars at the border and territorial disputes. Many 
of our construction sites were located in South Sudan, but now we cannot go back.” (Firm P, Interviewee P2) 
The spillover of socio-democratic conflicts at the regional level can result in greater volatilities across 
neighbouring states that in turn can expose Chinese MNEs to political risk, and disrupt their operations. One 
example that was repeatedly pinpointed by our interviewees was the spread of the ‘Arab Spring’ across the 
region of North Africa. The socio-political movement has reshaped the political environment of the region. The 
overthrow of political regimes and associated social unrest that took place simultaneously in several countries 
have seriously affected the proper functioning of market institutions. As a result, such regional-wide political 
shocks have exposed Chinese MNEs’ operations to extensive risks. 
“We have seen a major deterioration of the social and political environment in North Africa in recent years. 
Riots during the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011 affected our exports to other countries in the region.” (Firm I, 
Interviewee I1)   
Industry-sourced Political Risks in the EU 
Despite the progress in global market liberalization, industrial regulations and restrictions remain in place to 
oversee MNEs’ activities in most countries. While such restrictions can potentially affect the operations of all 
sectors, their impact on the ‘key industries’, including telecommunications, utilities, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, 
energy and financial services are particularly salient (García-Canal and Guillén 2008) as these industries are 
heavily regulated by the government. As a result, the demand and supply of goods and services in these 
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industries can be influenced by government policies such as product safety rules, entry requirements, and 
capacity control. Thus, the industrial sectors in which MNEs operate can have important implications for firms’ 
perceived risk in overseas markets. Evidence from our interviews indicates that Chinese MNEs operating in 
more liberalized industries hold very different views from those operating in more regulated industries in the EU.  
Regulated industries 
The European single market act came into force in the 1980s and resulted in a number of industries being 
regulated at the regional level to ensure internal market prosperit . For MNEs seeking opportunities in some of 
the abovementioned regulated sectors, restrictions have been levied at both market entry and operational levels. 
At market entry level, rules of entry, product testing requirements and the conversion of industrial standards 
have been imposed by the EC and other relevant authorities to regulate investment from outside the EU. The 
evidence reveals that such restrictions have resulted in Chinese MNEs having to face more complicated 
registration issues, which in themselves represent an important form of market entry barrier. For example, the 
herbal medicine sector has been regulated by the EC regarding product testing standards and registration 
procedures since 2004. Yet, the sophisticated procedures of registration have made Chinese pharmaceutical 
firms subject to greater market entry barriers and obliged them to incur much higher costs in order to market 
their products.    
“The registration process for herbal medicines is extremely complex in the EU and we have to pay huge fees to 
test our products. Maybe the testing procedures are feasible for medicines from Western countries because 
there is normally only one single ingredient in their products. But for Chinese medicines there are often multiple 
ingredients and we have to pay testing fees for each one. This is unaffordable for us.” (Firm N, Interviewee N1)  
Restrictions can also be imposed at the operational level to regulate business activities. For Chinese MNEs, the 
enforcement of output limits has made them subject to a higher degree of political intervention. A well-known 
example was the milk quota restriction that was introduced in 1980s which aimed to regulate competition within 
the European dairy sector. The milk quota system was still in place at the time of our interviews. As one 
interviewee noted, the output quantity restrictions imposed by the EU authority constituted a key political 
obstacle to their expansion in the European dairy industry.  
“Our plant in Ireland is limited by the EU milk quota restrictions. Once we exceed the quota, there will be a 
risk of fines. So, we only keep one production line in Europe.” (Firm G, Interviewee G1) 
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Liberalized industries 
In the past few decades, de-regulation has taken place in most industries in the EU and has resulted in reduced 
regulatory barriers and simplified administrative procedures. For Chinese MNEs operating in more liberalized 
industries characterized by fewer regulatory restrictions and policy interventions, the well-established industry 
infrastructure has provided them with a sound environment which has facilitated these firms’ operations in the 
EU.  
“Our businesses are in real estate and entertainment. These are consumption industries. There aren’t many 
policy restrictions from the UK or other European country governments.” (Firm F, Interviewee F1) 
Furthermore, the enforcement of the Single Market Act, which promotes the free movement of goods and 
services, has provided an open ground for firms to compete within the EU. The open market established by the 
Single Market Act is regarded as an important advantage by the majority of the interviewees. As one 
interviewee explained, the Single Market Act has facilitated their company’s access to a greater consumer base 
across the EU member states at much lower risk.   
“We manufacture our products in Ireland and can export to other EU states without worrying about tax or tariff 
because of the free movement in the EU.” (Firm H, Interviewee H1)  
Firm-behaviour Sourced Political Risks in Both Markets 
Despite the stark contrast in institutional environments between the EU and African states, our evidence 
revealed that the inappropriate behaviour of a small number of Chinese MNEs, such as ignorance of sustainable 
development, a lack of respect towards the local culture and hostile industrial relations, can trigger adverse local 
responses, thus exposing all Chinese MNEs to political risks in both markets. As our interviewees regularly 
pointed out, such inappropriate practices and behaviour have led to negative attitudes towards some Chinese 
MNEs by the host government and the general public.  
Negative local government attitude 
A lack of professional training can lead some Chinese MNEs to run the risk of violating local employment acts, 
and engaging in unethical conduct. Such inappropriate behaviour can lead to a poor opinion of all Chinese 
MNEs in the eyes of the local government, which could be followed by more stringent regulatory treatment on 
all Chinese MNEs investing in the local market. For example, tense industrial relations with local employees 
experienced by Chinese MNEs in both European and African markets can result in legal disputes. This may 
undermine the host government’s intention of attracting Chinese investment in order to generate greater 
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economic prosperity and employment opportunities. The host government may come to view Chinese MNEs as 
exploiting the local labour force rather than contributing to economic growth, especially in African countries. 
Such a negative attitude may lead to a stricter regulatory environment in which Chinese MNEs’ operate. 
 “Managing industrial relations is critical because it can drag us into trouble with the French government if we 
cannot get along with the local employees. For example, we had a problem of paying pensions to local staff and 
it almost took us to the court. This can potentially damage our image with the French government and result in 
more regulations imposed on our business.” (Firm O, Interviewee O2)  
“Injuries and accidents at our construction sites can make the Rwandan government think that Chinese 
companies do not care about protecting the local workers. They would certainly view this very unfavourably.” 
(Firm L, Interviewee L2) 
The weakly enforced regulatory framework in China has provided some Chinese MNEs with opportunities to 
exploit institutional voids and get away with unethical behaviour. However, such conduct is not tolerated by 
governments in the EU and African countries. As a result, tougher and sometimes dyadic-specific treatments 
have targeted unethical business practices which can form a critical source of political risk faced by all Chinese 
MNEs.  
“The degree of enforcement of the EC Act (Directive on Herbal Medicinal Products) varies in different member 
states…In some countries like the UK and Netherlands, the governments did not introduce many restrictions. 
But a number of counterfeits were found to be supplied by firms from China. They used toxic ingredients and 
caused serious side effects. After these scandals were reported, the UK government imposed stricter rules to 
regulate herbal medicines.” (Firm N, Interviewee N1)  
“There are many Chinese construction workers in Africa and they have a lot of troubles due to their behaviour. 
So the biggest issue that we have now is to get working visas for our workers because many African country 
governments have implemented a quota system to restrict the number of Chinese workers, which has caused 
problem with our operations there.” (Firm M, Interviewee M1) 
Negative local public attitude 
The disregard of local history, culture and religious rituals has frequently been mentioned by the interviewees as 
a critical issue that has caused Chinese MNEs trouble in European and African markets. Such ignorance can 
make the local public view these firms as socially irresponsible, hence damage the overall image of Chinese 
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MNEs and result in the boycotting of Chinese products. Political activities can be organised by local interested 
parties to influence their government’s attitude against Chinese MNEs’ operations. As one of the interviewees 
from Firm F explained, negligence of the host-country’s history and culture by a small number of Chinese 
MNEs can lead to local public aversion. As a result, they may lobby the government to impose stricter 
regulations on all Chinese MNEs or protest against their operations.   
“Our company has not realized the importance of having good public relations in Europe, so the locals tend to 
see us as disrespectful to their culture which can cause problems. The local public have voting power, so their 
attitude towards us to a great extent can influence their government’s attitude especially at the time of a general 
election. When the locals do not like us, they can lobby the government to suspend our operations. The 
government would also view us more negatively and treat our operations unfavourably.” (Firm F, Interviewee 
F2)   
“There were some Chinese businessmen who disregarded the local culture and religious rituals, which gave the 
locals a very bad impression and caused negative feedback towards all Chinese firms. Some local stakeholders 
have already attempted to persuade their government to put stricter controls on us.” (Firm I, Interviewee I1) 
Furthermore, a lack of attention to local economic development by some Chinese MNEs, as well as the loss of 
business opportunities and profits by the locals, have triggered adverse responses from the local interested 
public, and thus caused social disapproval of Chinese MNEs. As a result, the host-government’s sensitivity 
towards Chinese MNEs’ inappropriate conduct may be augmented by these local interested parties.  
“Overall, the relationship between our company and the local African people has become increasingly 
unfavourable. In countries like Tanzania, the locals are very hostile to us because they cannot gain from doing 
business with us. They think that the Chinese have taken all the profits away from them.” (Firm L, Interviewee 
L2) 
The lack of protection over intellectual property rights at home has provided some Chinese MNEs with the 
incentive to produce and sell counterfeit products. However, when expanding into overseas markets, the 
adoption of home-country practices can harm their reputation and cause greater distrust of their products among 
the local public. Such inappropriate practices lead to a negative view of Chinese companies by the host-country 
public. Public sentiments and distrust towards counterfeit products supplied by a small number of Chinese 
companies can prompt the local consumer associations and media to lobby their government to more carefully 
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control all Chinese MNEs’ operations by introducing new legislation or stricter requirements on Chinese 
products. This has occurred in both markets.  
“Selling counterfeit products by a few Chinese firms have damaged the reputation of Chinese medicines and the 
European consumers do not trust us anymore. A number of new regulations have been introduced in the 
Netherlands to inspect medicines from China after those scandals had been reported.” (Firm N, Interviewee N1) 
“There were some Chinese businessmen who sold counterfeit products to African consumers. So now we are not 
trusted by the locals and it has brought us many problems from their government.” (Firm M, Interviewee M1)  
DISCUSSION 
This study focuses on the political risk faced by Chinese MNEs when expanding into the EU and Africa. We 
find that their perceived political risks are country, industry and firm-behaviour related. Such risks are more 
complex than those encountered by DMNEs. This highlights the importance of unpacking the notion of political 
risk from the perspective of EEMNEs. In this section, we draw on the findings from our multiple case studies to 
discuss the way that Chinese MNEs perceive political risk and derive propositions accordingly.   
Propositions 
Home-country sourced political risks 
While the existing literature on political risk tends to focus on host-country factors, the rise in EEMNEs has 
challenged this conventional wisdom (Satyanand 2010). Since MNEs cannot always separate themselves from 
the image and influence of their home country when expanding abroad (Click 2012), it is important to take into 
account the impact of country-of-origin on the political risks faced by EEMNEs in foreign marketplaces. The 
country-of-origin, or home-country origin, refers to ‘the country where the corporate headquarters of the 
company marketing the product or brand is located’ (Johansson et al. 1985:391) and host-country governments 
are likely to react to the country-of-origin of MNEs (Stevens et al. 2015). Host-country governments may 
encourage MNEs from certain countries as they bring desirable resources; equally, they may be wary of other 
nationalities due to potential threats to a host-country’s national security and competitiveness (Cuervo-Cazurra 
2011). Thus, the home-country origin of EEMNEs can have critical implications for the way that they are 
perceived by the governments of both developed and developing countries.  
Our findings complement extant research by revealing that Chinese MNEs’ perceived political risks in the EU 
tend to originate from their home-country origin as they are treated as representatives of their home country 
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(Desbordes 2010). Concerns over national security that result from political resistance and competing economic 
interests can make the host government seek to ring-fence their national strategic assets from Chinese 
investment. Furthermore, access to home-country government financial support can lead host government to 
fear the unfair competition associated with investment by Chinese MNEs. Such concerns have resulted in extra 
scrutiny from the EU member governments. Hence, Chinese MNEs are exposed to risks caused by their 
‘Chinese’ label, representing a critical source of political risk in developed countries.  
Additionally, the evidence shows that political scrutiny has been more intensively exercised by host-country 
governments in the EU on Chinese SOEs than private firms due to their close affiliation with the Chinese 
government. This is consistent with Globerman and Shapiro’s (2009) observation that Chinese SOEs are more 
likely to face government speculation in the U.S. than their private counterparts. This reinforces the view that 
SOEs not only serve the economic purpose, but more importantly, the ideological purpose of projecting their 
home-government political and economic influence in overseas markets (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2014).  
Proposition 1: Chinese MNEs are likely to encounter political risks when a host-country government perceives 
them as posing potential threats to national security and competitiveness.  
Host-country sourced political risks 
Despite the increasing integration of global economic activities, the volatile political environment remains a 
critical concern that inhibits economic efficiency and national competitiveness in the developing world 
(Jakobsen 2010). The frequently changing political regimes and the weak legal framework in some developing 
countries can lead to the deterioration of living standards and loss of life. Moreover, regional political 
turbulence can profoundly disrupt social and economic activities. As a result, MNEs operating in these markets 
tend to face severe political turmoil and inconsistent regulatory treatment which can jeopardize their operations 
(Darendeli and Hill 2016).  
Our findings explicitly show that Chinese MNEs’ perceived political risks in African markets mainly result from 
exogenous political shocks and events. Such turmoil at domestic and regional levels represents a significant 
political challenge and can undermine their operational confidence. The findings are consistent with the view 
that host-country political volatilities tend to be a top concern for MNEs from both advanced and developing 
countries (Satyanand 2010). This concern may be explained by the traditional bargaining mechanism which 
suggests that the host-government’s bargaining power tends to increase vis-à-vis MNEs once the latter’s capital 
is sunk in the host country (Jakobsen 2010). The authoritarian political environment and discretionary 
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policymaking process in some African states have enabled Chinese MNEs to negotiate favourable terms before 
their entry. Yet, they have tended to underestimate the costs when the ‘rules of the game’ in the host country are 
changed at the post-entry stage (García-Canal and Guillén 2008). Our study suggests that Chinese MNEs at the 
post-entry stage mainly perceive political risk in Africa as stemming from the volatile political environment in 
the host country and the region. This shows that Chinese MNEs’ perceptions of political risk in Africa are 
similar to DMNEs (Casson and Lopes 2013). Thus, the traditional way of conceptualizing political risk by 
focusing on the deficiencies of a developing host-country’s political and regulatory environment is still relevant 
to EEMNEs operating in such a country.   
Proposition 2: Chinese MNEs are likely to encounter political risks in a developing host country with a volatile 
political environment and regional conflict. 
Industry-sourced political risks 
During the last few decades, technological changes and the reduction of trade barriers in most parts of the world 
have encouraged MNEs from virtually all industries to participate in international competition. However, such 
global economic integration does not replace the importance of national governments in regulating industrial 
policies and business activities. Industry-related regulations are still enacted by national governments to 
supervise and sometimes intervene in business operations. The impact of such policy interventions is 
particularly striking for MNEs operating in regulated industries (Holburn and Zelner 2010). Hence, industry-
related regulations levied by the host-country government represent a key source of political risk for foreign 
MNEs (García-Canal and Guillén 2008).  
Our findings revealed that the enforcement of industrial policies by the EU can be a mixed blessing for Chinese 
MNEs. On the positive side, several waves of de-regulation by the EU member states have allowed Chinese 
MNEs to compete on more equal terms within the EU. On the other hand, those operating in regulated industries 
are subject to restrictions imposed at the regional level which has resulted in greater entry barriers and 
operational complexities. It is recognized that MNEs in highly regulated industries require greater research 
attention (Holburn and Zelner 2010). Yet, extant literature has mainly focused on DMNEs expanding into the 
regulated industries of developing host countries (Bremmer 2014). The implication of industry-related political 
risks for EEMNEs has received scant attention. Our findings help to fill this gap by showing that industrial 
restrictions imposed by the EU can substantially affect Chinese MNEs’ expansion into those regulated industries. 
Thus, our findings not only confirm that the traditional conceptualization of industry-related political risks still 
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apply to Chinese MNEs, but also highlight the role of regional institutions in regulating foreign investment 
activities.   
Proposition 3: Chinese MNEs operating in more regulated industries are likely to encounter a higher degree of 
industry-sourced political risks than in more liberalized industries.    
Firm-behaviour sourced political risks 
Extant literature has stressed that the different levels of economic development between developed and 
developing countries have created contrasting environments, and hence different political risks for MNEs to deal 
with (Jakobsen 2010). A more nuanced aspect of political risk that stems from firms’ own behaviour has been 
under-explored. Our findings indicate that by importing unsuitable home-country practices, Chinese MNEs have 
commonly experienced firm-behaviour related political risks regardless of the stage of economic development 
of the host countries. While Chinese MNEs are prompted by the opportunities presented in European and 
African markets, inappropriate or self-destructive behaviour by a few Chinese firms may drag them into hostile 
relations with the host government. They may be perceived as failing to deliver their promise of boosting local 
economic growth, thus making their presence less legitimate in the eyes of the government (Stevens et al. 2015). 
The failure to achieve legitimacy, i.e. aligning business objectives with the political and economic agenda of the 
host-country government, can motivate the latter to intervene in business activities (Henisz and Zelner 2005). 
Specifically, unacceptable conduct by a small number of Chinese MNEs can prompt the local government to 
take political and regulatory actions. In other words, when firms are deemed to be untrustworthy with regard to 
self-regulation, the host-country government can impose rules in order to maintain market order and regulate 
firms’ behaviour. This has become an extra layer of political risk faced by Chinese MNEs in both developed and 
developing countries.   
Our findings further suggest that the host-country government’s evaluation of MNEs can be reinforced by the 
attitude of the public. As the government consists of individual policymakers and branches (Zelner et al. 2009), 
these constituents may constantly interact with other interested stakeholders, including consumers, political 
parties and media (Stevens et al. 2015). Hence, the way that these social groups and actors perceive Chinese 
MNEs can subsequently influence government and policymakers. Ignorance of the local norms by Chinese 
MNEs can undermine their social approval. Such unfavourable responses from the local interested parties can 
exert a powerful influence over government decisions through lobbying and demonstrations. As a result, the 
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political risks faced by Chinese MNEs are heightened through the interplay between the government and the 
public.  
Proposition 4: Chinese MNEs are likely to encounter political risks when the government and public in a host 
country are critical of their behaviour.  
Contributions     
By highlighting the heterogeneous types of political risk encountered by EEMNEs in international marketplaces, 
our research advances IB literature in three main ways. First, this study departs from mainstream research and 
challenges the assumption that political risks are exogenous and result from a host-country’s volatile political 
environment. Our findings show that political risk can arise endogenously from MNEs’ home-country identity 
and firms’ own inappropriate behaviour. Thus, our research contributes to extant literature by revealing the 
theoretical importance for reconceptualising political risk from the perspective of EEMNEs.  
Second, focusing on Chinese MNEs operating in the EU and African countries, we find that these new players 
tend to encounter more subtle and complex political risks than DMNEs which are grounded in a wide array of 
home and host country, industry and firm-behaviour sources. This enriches the existing research on political risk 
which overly focuses on the volatilities of a host-country’s political environment or industry characteristics. 
Thus, our reconceptualization of political risk provides a more complete understanding of its multidimensional 
nature and complex components.   
Third, by examining Chinese MNEs operating in developed and developing countries, we find that the boundary 
of political risk from the viewpoint of Chinese MNEs is dynamic, and varies with the external institutional 
environment. In the institutionally more stable and economically more advanced European market, Chinese 
MNEs’ perceived political risks are rooted in their home-country origin and regional industrial regulations. By 
contrast, they tend to perceive more traditional host-country sourced political risks in less-developed African 
markets. Some Chinese MNEs’ inappropriate practices represent a common concern that can lead these new 
players to encounter political obstacles in both markets. Thus, our study shows that the boundary of political risk 
analysis should be expanded to reflect the perspective of EEMNEs.  
Implications 
Our study has a number of policy and managerial implications. First, host-country governments’ concerns about 
their national security and the financial support granted to Chinese MNEs by the Chinese government, have 
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exposed those companies to home-country sourced political risks when venturing into more advanced 
economies, like the EU. As Chinese MNEs unavoidably carry the shadow of their home government, the 
Chinese government should consider providing Chinese MNEs with support in more internationally acceptable 
ways, such as updated information about a host-country’s market trends instead of direct subsidies and/or cheap 
loans. Second, Chinese MNEs should adopt comprehensive risk assessment strategies when expanding overseas. 
In developed host countries with well-established market systems, they should consider those implicit aspects of 
political risk, such as speculation and regulatory restrictions imposed by both the host-country and regional 
authorities. When operating in a developing host country with a volatile political environment, they need to 
develop effective risk management strategies, such as purchasing political risk insurance to protect their 
business interests. Third, Chinese managers should pay attention to their corporate social responsibility and 
avoid exporting unsuitable behaviour to their overseas operations since inappropriate conduct can lead to 
adverse attitudes towards Chinese investment by the host-country government and public. Chinese MNEs 
should invest in public relations and professional training to build a positive image in overseas markets.  
Limitations and Future Studies 
This study has several limitations which present avenues for future research. First, based on a sample of Chinese 
MNEs, we take an initial step to compare the types of political risks that EEMNEs encounter in different 
institutional settings. Future research could be extended to MNEs from other emerging economies and examine 
whether they face similar political risks. Second, we only focused on the concept of political risk in this study, 
but did not consider an equally important and related concept, uncertainty. Future research could explore how 
EEMNEs perceive and manage uncertainty in different institutional settings. Finally, our study is based on 
qualitative analysis, thus we are unable to draw any statistical inference regarding whether firm size, age and 
international experience moderate the perceptions of political risk by EEMNEs. Future studies could test the 
propositions derived from our study by controlling for these firm characteristics. 
CONCLUSION 
This study investigates an under-explored yet fundamental question as to how Chinese MNEs perceive political 
risk in the EU and Africa, and complements extant research that has largely drawn on conceptual models of 
DMNEs. Using a qualitative analysis approach, we found that political risks can stem from a set of country, 
industry and firm-behaviour sources for Chinese MNEs operating in both markets. The findings reveal that the 
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way that Chinese MNEs perceive political risk differs from DMNEs. Hence, our study helps develop a more 
complete conceptualization of this important factor from EEMNEs’ perspective.  
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 Table 1 Sample characteristics  
Firm(s) Interviewee(s) Industry Host country(ies) Years of 
international 
operation 
Ownership 
A A1; A2 Aircraft leasing Ireland 5 years SOE 
B B1; B2 Telecommunication – Operator  Spain; UK 10 years SOE 
C C1 Telecommunication – Equipment 
provider  
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
UK 
11 years Private 
D D1 Oil prospecting Angola, Uganda 11 years SOE 
E E1 Telecommunication – Equipment 
provider 
Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden, UK 
15 years Private 
F F1; F2 Real estate; Hospitality Spain, UK 5 years Private 
G G1; G2 Agriculture – Dairy  Ireland, Netherlands 6 years SOE 
H H1 Manufacturing – Infrared camera Germany, Ireland 8 years Private 
I I1; I2 Manufacturing – Textile  Egypt 7 years Private 
J J1; J2 Manufacturing – Elevator  Egypt 9 years Private 
K K1; K2 Manufacturing – Personal care Nigeria; Tanzania 8 years Private 
L L1; L2 Construction Rwanda; Tanzania; Uganda 7 years SOE 
M M1; M2 Construction Angola; Congo; Mauritius; Poland; Rwanda; Tanzania; UK 25 years SOE 
N N1 Pharmaceutical  Netherlands; South Africa 20 years Private 
O O1; O2 Agriculture – Dairy and Beverage France; UK 8 years SOE 
P P1; P2 Construction Algeria; Angola; Cameroon; Sudan; Tunisia 5 years SOE 
Sample = 16 firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Threats to host-country 
national security  
Home-country sourced 
political risks
Firm-behaviour sourced 
political risks
Unfair competition
Key regulated industries
Liberalized industries
Negative local public attitude
Negative local government 
attitude
Industry-sourced 
political risks
 
Fig 1a Political Risks in Developed Countries (EU) 
1st Order codes 2nd Order codes                          Aggregated dimensions 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
• Leakage of strategic assets, resources, and technologies to 
Chinese MNEs  
• Chinese government involvement in business operations 
• Chinese MNEs’ carriage of political agenda 
• Direct financial support through subsidies 
• Indirect financial support through cheap loans 
 
• Regulatory barriers at entry level 
• Regulatory barriers at operational level 
 
 
• Low level of regulatory barriers 
• Open competition 
• Tense industrial relations with local employees 
• Unethical conduct 
• Disregard of local history and culture 
• Victims of Chinese counterfeit products’ / poor reputation 
 
 Volatile politial environment 
in the host country
Host-country sourced 
political risks
Firm-behaviour sourced 
political risks
Regional conflicts
Negative local government 
attitude
Negative local public 
attitude
Fig 1b Political Risks in Developing Countries (Africa)  
1st Order codes                                                                            2nd Order codes                             Aggregated dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
• Political regime change and politically 
motivated social violence 
• Weakly enforced law and regulations 
 
• Interstate wars and territorial disputes 
• Spread of socio-democratic movements  
• Tense industrial relations with local employees 
• Unethical conduct 
• Disregard of local history, religious ritual and 
culture 
• Victims of Chinese counterfeit products’ / poor 
reputation 
• Seizing local employment and business 
opportunities 
